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Work Disability
The Eﬀects of Demography, 
Health, and Disability Insurance
Axel Börsch-  Supan
2.1    Introduction
Disability insurance—the insurance against the loss of the ability to 
work—is a substantial part of public social expenditures and an important 
part of the social safety net of all developed countries. Like almost all ele-
ments of modern social security systems, disability insurance faces a trade-
 o ﬀ. On the one hand, disability insurance is a welcome and necessary part 
of the social safety net, as it prevents income losses for those who lose their 
ability to work before the normal retirement age. On the other hand, dis-
ability insurance may be misused to serve as an early retirement route even 
if the normal ability to work is not aﬀected at all.
Understanding the trade-  oﬀ between social safety provision and its mis-
use is important for the design of a modern social security system that 
maximizes social safety provision under increasingly tight ﬁ  nancial budget 
constraints (Aarts, Burkhauser, and de Jong 1996). The aim of this chapter 
is to use the newly collected SHARE data (the Survey of Health, Aging, and 
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Retirement in Europe) together with data from its sister surveys in England 
(ELSA, the English Longitudinal Study on Aging) and the United States 
(HRS, the Health and Retirement Study) to shed light on this trade-  oﬀ.
A starting point for this chapter is the striking variation of the expen-
ditures on disability insurance across European countries and the United 
States (see ﬁ  gure 2.1). This and the two following ﬁ  gures are based on the 
oﬃcial ﬁ  gures provided by the European Union, collected as part of the 
European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics, which employ 
a harmonized deﬁ  nition of disability insurance. The data for the United 
States in ﬁ  gures 2.1 and 2.2 are taken from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD 2003) and uses a comparable deﬁ  ni-
tion. Unfortunately, it is only available for 1999.
While the EU15 countries (i.e., the ﬁ  fteen countries that formed the 
European Union before its enlargement in 2005) spend, on average, about 
8 percent of their social expenditures on disability insurance, it is much 
higher—about 14 percent—in the Scandinavian countries and also higher 
in the two Anglo- Saxon countries (about 10 percent in the United Kingdom 
and the United States). In turn, some countries, such as France, Greece, and 
Ireland, spend only about 5 percent.
Figure 2.2 shows that this variation is not a matter of rich and poor coun-
tries: the order of countries and the range is about the same when correcting 
for gross domestic product (GDP) diﬀerences across countries. The only 
substantial change is the United States. Since U.S. total social expenditures 
are about half of what they are in Europe, disability insurance expenditures 
as percentage of GDP are much smaller in the United States than the share 
of disability insurance in social expenditures.
Absolute expenditures have risen in all EU15 countries (see ﬁ  gure 2.3). 
The pattern over time, however, is quite diﬀerent across countries. Especially 
Sweden and Denmark exhibit a sharp increase since about the year 2000, 
while the Netherlands and Finland have about stabilized their very large 
expenditures on disability insurance until the mid-  1990s.
The range of per capital expenditures is enormous, even after correcting 
for purchasing power diﬀerences within the European Union.1 Sweden and 
Denmark spend four to ﬁ  ve times more on disability insurance than France 
and the Mediterranean countries. The U.S. spending corresponds to 89 per-
cent of the EU15 average.
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to isolating the causes under-
lying the large cross-  national variation of disability insurance expendi-
tures and the diﬀerent expenditure patterns over time visible in ﬁ  gures 2.1 
through 2.3.
Three causes are commonly mentioned to explain the large variation: 
demographics, health, and institutions. First, while all European countries 
are aging, the extent of population varies considerably. Hence, the ﬁ  rst 
1. This correction includes diﬀerential purchasing power in the euro zone.Work Disability    3 9
explanation claims that a country with an older population also has a higher 
prevalence of disability insurance uptake. A second potential cause for the 
cross- national variation is international variation in health status. One might 
hypothesize that in countries that have lower physical and mental health, 
disability insurance is taken up more frequently than in countries with bet-
ter health status.
Fig. 2.1    Share of disability insurance expenditures in total 
expenditures   (percentages)
Source: Eurostat Data Archive 2005 and OECD 2003.
Fig. 2.2    Disability insurance expenditures as percent of GDP (percentages)
Source: Eurostat Data Archive 2005 and OECD 2003.40    Axel  Börsch-Supan
Third, recent studies such as the string of international comparisons by 
Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004, and 2005) and the OECD study by Blön-
dal and Scarpetta (1998), based on the Gruber and Wise (1999) methodol-
ogy, have shown that public old-  age pension systems exert large incentive 
eﬀects which, according to each country’s legislation, signiﬁ  cantly increase 
the uptake of early retirement provisions. Similar incentive eﬀects may also 
arise from disability insurance. Figure 2.4 may indicate that this is the case. 
It shows early and normal eligibility age for public old-  age pension, and 
the actual average age of withdrawal from the labor force. Some countries 
have an average withdrawal age that is considerably lower than the earliest 
eligibility age for old-  age pensions. Because few people can aﬀord to retire 
without public retirement income, disability insurance or other transfer 
income may ﬁ  ll the gap in these countries. Particular striking examples are 
Austria, Belgium, and France, where the average withdrawal age is younger 
than age sixty. But also in Denmark and the United Kingdom, countries 
with a generally much higher retirement age, the average withdrawal age is 
below the earliest eligibility age for old-  age pensions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the Survey of 
Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and describes how we 
merged comparable data from the English Longitudinal Study on Aging 
(ELSA) and the U.S. Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The section ends 
with a set of descriptive statistics characterizing our sample.
The richness of these microdata permits us to estimate regressions that 
Fig. 2.3    Disability insurance expenditures per capita (Euro, purchasing 
power parity)
Source: Eurostat Data Archive 2005.Work Disability    4 1
relate the uptake of disability insurance to demographic and health charac-
teristics of the respondents in these surveys. Section 2.3 reports the result of 
these regressions, and section 2.4 applies them to a counterfactual exercise: 
what would disability uptake rates look like if there were no demographic 
and health- related diﬀerences among the twelve European countries and the 
United States in our sample? As it turns out, demographic and health- related 
diﬀerences across countries do not explain much of the cross- national varia-
tion in disability enrolment rates.
Section 2.5 therefore turns to the institutional details of the disability 
schemes and regresses disability insurance enrollment on a set of institu-
tional variables derived from recent OECD work. Our main result is that 
more than 75 percent of the cross-  national variation can be explained by 
a parsimonious set of a few variables describing the generosity of, and the 
ease of access to, disability insurance. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2      The Data: SHARE, ELSA, and HRS
The SHARE is modeled closely after the U.S. HRS (see Juster and Suz-
man 1995)—the ﬁ  rst survey of this kind—and the ELSA (see Marmot 
et al. 2003), which followed the lead by HRS. Researchers from HRS and 
ELSA have been participating in the design process of SHARE at all stages. 
About two-  thirds of the variables in SHARE are identical to variables in 
ELSA and HRS, and most of the remainder is closely comparable, so one 
can map these variables into each other. The longitudinal sequence of waves 
Fig. 2.4    Retirement age in Europe
Source: European Commission (2004).42    Axel  Börsch-Supan
is synchronized among SHARE, ELSA, and HRS. The SHARE started in 
2004 and 2005 when HRS already had ﬁ  ve waves, and ELSA started the 
ﬁ  rst reinterview. This is the data on which this chapter is based. In 2006 and 
2007 HRS collected its sixth wave, ELSA the third, and SHARE the second 
wave of data.
The SHARE, HRS, and ELSA are truly multidisciplinary surveys. Vari-
ables include health variables (e.g., self-  reported health, physical function-
ing, cognitive functioning, physical measures such as grip strength and 
walking speed, health behavior, use of health care facilities); psychological 
variables (e.g., psychological health, well- being, life satisfaction); economic 
variables (e.g., current work activity, job characteristics, opportunities to 
work past retirement age, employment history, pension rights, sources and 
composition of current income, wealth and consumption, housing, educa-
tion); and social support variables (e.g., assistance within families, transfers 
of income and assets, social networks, volunteer activities, time use).
The SHARE, as opposed to HRS and ELSA, has one additional dimen-
sion. Unlike these one-  country surveys, SHARE is ex-  ante harmonized 
cross- national. The ﬁ  rst wave in 2004 involved eleven countries, representing 
Europe’s economic, social, institutional, and cultural diversity from Scan-
dinavia (Denmark, Sweden) across Western and Central Europe (Austria, 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland) to the Mediter-
ranean (Greece, Italy, Spain). In 2006, additional data came from the Czech 
Republic, Ireland, Israel, and Poland. The SHARE is the ﬁ  rst European 
data set to combine extensive cross- national information on socioeconomic 
status, health, and family relationships of the elderly population.
This chapter uses the ﬁ  rst release of the SHARE baseline data. It contains 
22,777 individuals age ﬁ  fty and older (including spouses, irrespective of age) 
in ten countries; see table 2.1 for a detailed breakdown. We augment this 
sample by the recent release of the Belgian SHARE data.
Table 2.1 shows the unit response rates of SHARE in comparison to 
other recent multinational surveys in Europe. It compares favorably to the 
other surveys, although the weighted average (62 percent, unweighted 60 
percent) is still lower than what is typically seen in the United States. The 
appropriate comparison is probably with the newest HRS cohort (the early 
baby boomers cohort drawn in 2004), which has a response rate at baseline 
of 69 percent. Earlier, the HRS has experienced much higher, but declining 
response rates. For the initial cohort of HRS in 1992, a response rate of 82 
percent could be achieved, while the samples drawn in 1998 had a response 
rate of 70 percent. There is no directly comparable response rate of ELSA, 
since the sample of ELSA was based on those who were successfully inter-
viewed in the Health Survey of England (HSE). The response rate was low-
est in Switzerland, which is typical for this country, and highest in France, 
where the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) 
conducted the survey.Work Disability    4 3
Unit nonresponse was compensated by adjusting the design weights. This 
was done in a calibration approach. In most countries the weights were 
calibrated against national population totals stratiﬁ  ed by narrow age bands 
and gender. In two countries more information could be used (including 
economic status), while in two other countries only the national totals of 
the ﬁ  fty and over population, stratiﬁ  ed by gender, could enter the calibration 
of weights. Details are reported by Klevmarken, Swensson, and Hesselius 
(2006).
The SHARE has made great eﬀorts to deliver truly comparable data 
in order to permit a reliable study of how diﬀerences in cultures, living 
conditions, and policy approaches are shaping the life of Europeans just 
before and after retirement. The questionnaire has been translated accord-
ing to a protocol ensuring functional equivalence and was administered 
by a Computer Assisted Personal Interview (CAPI) plus a drop-  oﬀ self- 
completion part. Interview procedures have been harmonized with the help 
of a joint case management system. Methodological details of the study are 
reported by Börsch-  Supan and Jürges (2005), and ﬁ  rst results summarized 
in Börsch-  Supan et al. (2005). The SHARE data is available at http:/  /  www
.share-  project.org. Further data processing and record matching are still 
ongoing. A second data release was published in 2007 with more than 30,000 
individuals.
This chapter is based on an extract of variables of SHARE 2004, ELSA 
Table 2.1  Sample size and response rate of SHARE and other European surveys
SHARE 2004 Eurostat
Scientiﬁ  c surveys
EVS


















2002   Avg.
Austria 1,986 58.1 — — — 62.4 77 49 63.9 63.1
Denmark 1,732 63.2 62 75 68 65.1 57 59 66.1 64.6
France 1,842 73.6 79 (a) — — 42 44 20.3 46.3
Germany 3,020 63.4 47 (a) 57 50.0 42 49 42.7 47.9
Greece 2,142 61.4 (a) — 80 78.8 82 28 — 67.2
Italy 2,559 55.1 (a) — 44 — 68 — — 56.0
Netherlands 3,000 61.3 (a) 59 68 — 40 30 46.6 48.7
Spain 2,419 53.3 67 (a) 53 54.8 24 — (a) 49.7
Sweden 3,067 50.2 — (a) 69 65.8 41 31 57.2 52.8
Switzerland 1,010 37.6 — — 34 46.9 — — 32.8 37.9
Total∗   22,777   61.8   62.0   63.2   55.6   54.9   46.4   43.9   36.7   50.8
Source: De Luca and Peracchi (2005).
Notes: (a) no prescreening response rate reported, (—) country not in sample, (∗) weighted average. 
ECHP: European Community Household Panel; EU-  LFS: European Labour Force Survey; ESS: Euro-
pean Social Survey; EVS: European Values Study; EES: European Election Study; ISSP: International 
Social Survey Project.44    Axel  Börsch-Supan
2004, and HRS 2004, which include whether a person receives disability 
insurance or not, basic demographic characteristics, and a broad set of 
health variables. These health variables include self-  reported health; func-
tional status measured by indicators of (instrumental) activities of daily liv-
ing; a set of mental health questions (including the Center for Epidemiologic 
Studies Depression Scale [CES- D]) indicating dementia and depression; and 
physical measurements such as body mass index, walking speed, and grip 
strength. Most variables are identical in all three surveys. Weight and height 
(to compute body mass index) are self- reported in HRS and SHARE, while 
ELSA had interviewers actually measure the respondents. Grip strength is 
only available in the eleven SHARE countries.
Disability insurance is deﬁ  ned as all branches of publicly-  ﬁ  nanced insur-
ances against the loss of the ability to perform gainful employment. Table 
2.2 lists the institutions in each country by their proper name.
Figure 2.5 shows the enrollment in disability insurance by age for the 
eleven SHARE countries. Enrollment rises steeply from 4 percent, on 
average, across all SHARE countries at age ﬁ  fty to almost 10 percent at age 
sixty- ﬁ  ve. Disability insurance enrollment declines sharply after age sixty-
 ﬁ ve to a percentage lower than at age ﬁ  fty. The reason for this sharp decline 
is that in most countries disability insurance beneﬁ  ts are automatically con-
verted to old-  age pension beneﬁ  ts at age sixty-  ﬁ  ve.
We therefore restrict our analysis to individuals in the time window from 
Table 2.2  Disability insurance schemes considered
Austria (AT) Staatliche Invaliditätspension
Belgium (BE) Assurance invalidité légale/Wettelijke uitkering wegens arbeidsongeval 
of beroepsziekte; Pension de maladie, d’invalidité, maladie 
professionnelle/Wettelijke uitkering wegens ziekte of invaliditeit 
of tegemoetkoming aan personen met een handicap
Switzerland (CH) Invalidenrente aus IV, assurance invalidité légale (AI) and Rendità 
invalidità (AI)
Germany (DE) Erwerbsminderungsrente and Beamtenpension wegen 
Dienstunfähigkeit
Denmark (DK) Oﬀentlig sygedagpenge and oﬀentlig førtidspension
Spain (ES) Pensión pública contributiva y no contributiva de invalidez/
incapacidad
France (FR) Prestation publique d’invalidité (AAH, APA)
Greece (GR) Suvntaxh anaperiva"
Italy (IT) Assicurazione pubblica di disabilità (anche assegno di 
accompagnamento) and pnsione pubblica di invalidità o di inabilità
Netherlands (NL) WAO, Waz of invaliditeitspensioen and Algemene bijstandswet 
(Abw), IOAW/IOAZ, aanvullende bijstandsuitkering, 
Toeslagenwet (TW)
Sweden (SE) Förtidspension (sjukersättning), yrkesskadepension, and sjukbidrag
England (UK) Incapacity beneﬁ  ts (previously invalidity beneﬁ  ts)
United States (US)  SSDI and SSI disability pensionWork Disability    4 5
age ﬁ  fty to age sixty-  ﬁ  ve. Our SHARE release covers 15,808 individuals of 
this age. The ELSA and HRS contribute 6,732 and 4,270 individuals, respec-
tively, to the joint sample, which therefore consists of 26,810 individuals. For 
joint descriptive statistics, the calibrated weights in SHARE, ELSA, and 
HRS have been renormalized to give each country equal weight.
Our introductory ﬁ  nding of a striking variation across European coun-
tries in the number of persons who receive disability insurance beneﬁ  ts is 
echoed in the SHARE-  ELSA-  HRS microdata (see ﬁ  gure 2.6).
We can distinguish four country groups. Very high enrollment rates exist 
in Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Between 13 and 16 percent of 
individuals between ﬁ  fty and sixty-  ﬁ  ve years of age receive disability insur-
ance beneﬁ  ts in this ﬁ  rst group of countries. The second group has enroll-
ment rates around the average enrollment rate of 7.5 percent. This group 
consists of Switzerland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
with the United Kingdom substantially above this average. Here the enroll-
ment ranges from 6 to almost 10 percent. Belgium, Germany, France, and 
Italy, the third group, have below-  average enrollment rates between 4 and 6 
percent. In Austria and Greece, less than 3 percent of individuals between 
ﬁ  fty and sixty-  ﬁ  ve years of age receive disability insurance beneﬁ  ts.
Disability insurance enrollment is only slightly higher among men than 
among women (see table 2.3).
There are, however, striking international diﬀerences. In Sweden and Den-
mark, it is mainly women who contribute to the very high enrollment rates, 
relative to the rest of Europe. In the Netherlands, the third country with 
very high enrollment rates, it is the other way around and more men enroll 
Fig. 2.5    Disability insurance enrollment by age
Note: Percentage of individuals enrolled in disability insurance by age. SHARE 2004. 
Weighted data.46    Axel  Börsch-Supan
than women. This may point to institutional features; we will come back to 
this point in section 2.6.
Self-  reported health is much worse among those who are on disability 
insurance; see the left panels of ﬁ  gure 2.7. While 19.7 percent report poor 
health among the enrolled, only 2.9 are among the not enrolled. In turn, 
only 9.8 percent report excellent or very good health among the enrolled, 
while this share is 42.5 percent among the not enrolled. Nonetheless, it is a 
striking ﬁ  nding that almost 10 percent report excellent or very good health 
in spite of being on disability insurance.
The health diﬀerences are less pronounced when measured more objec-
tively as grip strength. Respondents use a little machine that they have to 
press two times with each hand; the maximum is reported in the right panels 
of ﬁ  gure 2.7. Average grip strength is 38.1 kilograms among the not enrolled, 
while individuals on disability insurance have lower grip strength of 34.4 
kilograms. Grip strength has a fairly large standard deviation (about 13 kilo-
grams), but the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁ  cant in this large sample.
The discrepancy between very large self-  reported health diﬀerences 
Fig. 2.6    Disability insurance enrollment in Europe, 2004
Note: SHARE 2004, ELSA 2004, and HRS 2004. Age ﬁ  fty to sixty-  ﬁ  ve. Weighted data.
Table 2.3  Disability insurance enrollment by country and gender
    Austria   Germany   Sweden   Netherlands   Spain   Total
Male 4.65 6.15 9.39 15.79 11.44 8.40
Female 1.88   3.41   20.12   11.78   5.82 8.00
Italy   France   Denmark   Switzerland   Belgium
Male 5.21 4.92 11.18 5.81 6.82 8.40
Female  3.87   2.35   17.20   4.10   4.63   8.00
Source: SHARE 2004. Weighted data.Work Disability    4 7
and signiﬁ  cant but less pronounced diﬀerences in the more objective grip 
strength measure may hint at justiﬁ  cation bias of self-  reported health (Sen 
2002). Individuals who have enrolled in disability insurance may justify this 
by reporting a lower health status than what can be measured more objec-
tively by grip strength.
2.3      Explaining Microdata Variation in Disability Insurance Enrollment
Our aim is to look at which weight each of the three potential causes—
demographics, health, and institutions—has in explaining disability enroll-
ment in Europe. We exploit the richness of the SHARE, ELSA, and HRS 
microdata to relate individual disability insurance enrollment probabilities 
to three types of variables:
￿    Demographic characteristics (age and gender)
￿    A broad set of health measures, ranging from self-  reported health to 
more objective measurements of the functional physical (ADL: activi-
ties of daily living, IADL: instrumental activities of daily living) and 
mental health status (CES-  D test battery of mental health).
￿    A set of variables characterizing the generosity of the disability insur-
ance in each country (coverage, minimum disability level required for 
Fig. 2.7    Health by disability insurance status
Source: SHARE 2004. Weighted data.48    Axel  Börsch-Supan
full beneﬁ  ts, beneﬁ  t generosity, medical assessment, vocational assess-
ment, generosity of unemployment beneﬁ  ts). These variables are taken 
from Annex A.2.1 in OECD (2003), see the appendix to this chapter 
for a detailed description.
We run three regressions: a probit model of being enrolled in disability 
insurance, a Weibull proportional hazards model of the age when an indi-
vidual enrolls in disability insurance, and ﬁ  nally, a simple linear model for 
the probability to be enrolled into disability insurance. Table 2.4 presents the 
results in four blocks: demographic variables, health variables, institutional 
variables, and interactions among them.
A ﬁ  rst ﬁ  nding is the similarity among the three speciﬁ  cations. A second 
observation is the large unexplained variation. The (Pseudo-  )R2 in the two 
probability models is slightly higher than 0.25; a quarter of the individual 
variation in our microdata is not explained in spite of a rich speciﬁ  cation 
of health. The duration model has a somewhat lower explanatory power. 
This is in line with the ﬁ  ndings of OECD (2003) where only little correla-
tion between “medical disability status” and “disability enrollment status” 
was found.
Demographic variables are jointly signiﬁ  cant. Women have a lower proba-
bility to enroll into disability insurance, conditional on health. Also this was 
a ﬁ  nding of OECD (2003). Older age increases to probability to be enrolled 
until about age sixty-  three. We apply a piecewise linear speciﬁ  cation, with 
breakpoints at ages ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve and sixty. Notable is the sharp increase in the 
enrollment probability between ages ﬁ  fty and ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve.
All health variables are strongly signiﬁ  cant. Since we do not have grip 
strength and walking speed in all three surveys, these variables are not 
included. Including them in the SHARE sample reduces the signiﬁ  cance of 
the self-  reported health measure considerably, but leaves the overall results 
unaﬀected; this corresponds to the ﬁ  ndings reported in ﬁ  gure 2.7. Note-
worthy is the signiﬁ  cant eﬀect of mental illness, measured by the CES-  D 
battery, conditional on physical health, and the strong eﬀect of instrumental 
activities of daily living (IADLs) probably picking up work-  related disabil-
ity. Given these functional measures, self-  reported health remains highly 
signiﬁ  cant and quantitatively large.
Demographics and health explain, in isolation, about a sixth of the total 
variation of the linear model. This is not much, and corresponds to the 
already cited OECD ﬁ  ndings.
The institutional variables are also highly jointly signiﬁ  cant. Since they 
are country-  speciﬁ  c and thus have much less variation than the microdata, 
we use the “cluster” speciﬁ  cation to correct the t-  statistics accordingly. All 
measures are scored by the OECD from 0 to 5. Coverage measures on a 0 
to 5 scale which population groups are eligible for insurance. The highest 
score is given if disability insurance covers the entire population; the low-Work Disability    4 9
est score if only employees are covered. A broad coverage increases dis-
ability enrollment, but the eﬀect is surprisingly small and insigniﬁ  cant. A 
lenient minimum disability level to claim beneﬁ  ts has more inﬂ  uence on 
disability insurance uptake and is signiﬁ  cant in all three speciﬁ  cations. The 
generosity of beneﬁ  ts is signiﬁ  cant, but with an unexpected negative sign, 
as is the disability level required for full beneﬁ  ts. The strictness of a medical 
exam reduces disability uptake. Whether vocational considerations play a 
Table 2.4  Regression results
    Probit   z   Weibull   z   Linear   T
Female –0.661 –1.91 0.430 –1.71 –0.078 –1.39
Age  55 –1.068 –0.58 2.602 0.19 –0.094 –0.31
Age  60 0.385 0.1 12.949 0.49 0.123 0.25
Age- lin1 0.027 2.05 0.940 –1.84 0.003 2.29
Age- lin2 0.006 0.15 0.955 –0.56 0.001 0.12
Age- lin3 –0.006 –0.09 0.960 –0.45 –0.002 –0.22
SRH- excellent –0.896 –6.86 0.141 –8.14 –0.063 –2.62
SRH- very  good –0.534 –4.28 0.324 –7.5 –0.041 –2.15
SRH- fair –0.007 –0.06 1.417 0.68 –0.192 –4.73
SRH- poor 0.361 2.49 2.206 1.55 –0.078 –1.53
CES- D  (sum) 0.058 4.88 1.087 4.33 0.008 2.84
ADL (sum) 0.054 1.33 1.052 1.04 0.022 1.9
IADL (sum) 0.221 4.6 1.257 4.42 0.061 3.7
Coverage 0.039 0.68 1.320 1.96 –0.023 –2.19
Min. beneﬁ  ts 0.361 4.39 1.992 3.09 0.036 2.39
Full beneﬁ  ts –0.184 –2.18 0.616 –2.87 0.003 0.26
Generosity –0.329 –5.03 0.546 –2.71 –0.028 –3.12
Permanent 0.049 1.87 1.175 2.59 –0.006 –0.81
Medical 0.069 2.71 1.106 1.46 0.006 1.4
Vocational –0.121 –1.79 0.943 –0.31 –0.040 –3.29
UI- Beneﬁ  ts 0.106 4.02 1.120 1.3 0.022 3.02
covg_fem 0.205 4.87 1.447 4.46 0.027 3.18
minl_fem 0.015 0.15 1.025 0.14 0.000 –0.03
Full_fem –0.086 –1.17 0.810 –1.71 –0.005 –0.52
geno_fem –0.018 –0.23 0.908 –0.53 –0.002 –0.2
covg_old –0.032 –0.92 0.922 –0.99 0.000 0
minl_old –0.118 –1.65 0.819 –1.08 –0.003 –0.37
full_old –0.048 –1.12 0.882 –1.25 –0.010 –1.94
geno_old 0.173 2.72 1.353 1.6 0.011 1.32
covg_hfpoor 0.110 5.27 1.008 0.09 0.078 14.63
minl_hfpoor 0.091 2.12 0.918 –0.45 0.072 7.95
full_hfpoor 0.063 1.32 1.430 2.67 –0.024 –2.88
geno_hfpoor –0.036 –0.95 1.111 0.53 –0.030 –7.68
Constant –1.827 –0.71 1.256 35.76 0.182 0.49
(Pseudo- )R2       0.2588       0.1957       0.2667
Note: Based on 9,388 individuals age ﬁ  fty through sixty- ﬁ  ve in SHARE 2004, ELSA 2002, and 
HRS 2004.50    Axel  Börsch-Supan
role in the eligibility process or not is insigniﬁ  cant, as is the permanence of 
 beneﬁ  ts.
The last institutional variable measures the duration and beneﬁ  t level 
of unemployment compensation, a possible alternative to disability insur-
ance as an early retirement device. It is scored 5 for a short duration and 
lower unemployment beneﬁ  ts than disability insurance beneﬁ  ts. Indeed, 
tight unemployment insurance increases disability insurance enrollment in 
a highly signiﬁ  cant and quantitatively important way.
Finally, we also interact the institutional variables with selected demo-
graphic and health variables. These interactions explain 20.6 percent of the 
total variation in the linear model, thus more than demographics and health 
together. They exhibit some interesting features, especially when compared 
to the institutional variables alone. They explain some of the surprising ﬁ  nd-
ings just discussed. For example, the surprisingly small inﬂ  uence of coverage 
turns into a very large eﬀect for women and those of poor health. The latter 
is a straightforward to explain; the former may be a result of the low labor 
force participation of European women who have diﬃculties to be eligible 
for a normal old-  age pension and thus may seek disability pensions. This 
corresponds to the very high female enrollment in some countries (see table 
2.3). In Germany, a lenient eligibility to disability insurance for women was 
explicitly a policy instrument in the early 1980s.
Another example is the generosity variable, which carries an unexpected 
negative sign in the overall regression, but is strongly positive for the older 
part of the sample (age sixty and over).
2.4      Counterfactual Simulations: Controlling for Demography and Health
This section predicts what enrollment rates would look like if demograph-
ics and health were equal across countries. If demographic diﬀerences were 
the main cause for enrolling into disability insurance, enrollment rates should 
be very similar after taking demographic diﬀerences out. We then go through 
the same procedure for diﬀerences in health status.
Our ﬁ  rst step is to normalize disability insurance enrollment with respect 
to demographic diﬀerences across countries. Italy, for instance, has an older 
population than the European average, while Denmark has a younger popu-
lation. We use the regression results of table 2.4 to establish the inﬂ  uence of 
age and gender on disability insurance take up. We then predict, in a coun-
terfactual simulation exercise, which share of our sample individuals would 
take up disability insurance if all countries had the same age and gender 
distribution as the average of the SHARE countries. The result is shown in 
ﬁ  gure 2.8, comparing the counterfactual simulation results to the baseline 
results depicted in ﬁ  gure 2.6.
Quite clearly, taking account of demographic diﬀerences does not make 
a substantive diﬀerence. Italy, featuring the highest average age of individu-Work Disability    5 1
als between ﬁ  fty and sixty-  ﬁ  ve years of age among the thirteen countries, 
would have a slightly lower disability insurance enrollment if it had the age 
distribution of the average country. In Denmark, which is younger than 
average, the opposite would happen. The eﬀects, however, are very small. 
Demographic diﬀerences across Europe cannot explain why the enrollment 
rates in disability insurance are so diﬀerent in Europe.
Our second step is, therefore, to account for diﬀerence in the health status 
of the population. The health status diﬀers along many dimensions across 
countries. A ﬁ  rst dimension is self-  assessed health. Self-  assessed health is 
relatively poor in Italy and Spain; it is best in Switzerland. One major con-
cern with the self-  assessed health ratings, however, is that respondents do 
not perceive the health self- assessment scale given to them as absolute. Indi-
viduals with the same true health status may have diﬀerent reference levels 
against which they judge their health. This sheds doubt on the comparability 
of such measures across countries (e.g., Groot 2000; Sen 2002). We therefore 
also included more objective measures such as the physical performance in 
daily activities (e.g., walking or bathing) in the regression reported in table 
2.4. In this second dimension, Germany exhibits the most limitations and 
Greece the least. A third dimension is mental health. Depression, an often 
named reason for taking up disability insurance, varies quite substantially 
across the SHARE countries. Spain, Italy, and France show the worst scores 
on the CES- D depression scale, while Denmark, Germany, and Switzerland 
have the lowest share of depression cases. Hence, the cross-  national varia-
tion in health status looks like a good candidate to explain the variation in 
disability insurance enrollment.
We use the same methodology to correct for the inﬂ  uence of the multidi-
mensional health diﬀerences as we did with demographics. We ﬁ  rst establish 
the inﬂ  uence of health on disability insurance take up, and then predict 
Fig. 2.8    Actual and predicted disability insurance enrollment if age and gender 
were identical in all countries
Note: Based on linear regression speciﬁ  cation in table 2.3.52    Axel  Börsch-Supan
which share of our sample individuals would take up disability insurance 
if the health status measured along the aforementioned four dimensions 
would be identical to the average of our thirteen countries. The results are 
shown in ﬁ  gure 2.9.
The diﬀerences between enrollment rates under the actual and a hypo-
thetically identical health status are now more pronounced. In general, the 
counterfactual enrollment rates go up in countries with good health, and 
down in countries with lower health status than the average, as expected. If 
the Italians and Spaniards had the same health status as the average person 
in our sample, their disability insurance enrollment would be much lower. 
The same holds, notably, for the two Anglo- Saxon countries. In Switzerland, 
Denmark, and Sweden, it would be considerably higher.
If health would be the dominant explanation for disability insurance 
enrollment, the predicted shares should be equal across countries, once 
health is identical in all countries. As ﬁ  gure 2.9 shows, this is clearly not the 
case. There are still pronounced diﬀerences. The high enrollment rates in 
Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, especially, remain either relatively 
stable after correcting for health diﬀerences (Netherlands), or they increase 
even further (Sweden and Denmark). We conclude that diﬀerences in health 
across Europe cannot explain the cross-  national variation in the European 
disability insurance enrollment; in fact, it is just the opposite. In Sweden and 
Denmark, enrollment rates are high in spite of a very good health status of 
the ﬁ  fty-   to sixty-  ﬁ  ve-  year-  olds in our sample.
A logical next step is to correct for diﬀerences in demographics and health 
simultaneously, using the same methodology as before. Figure 2.10 shows 
the results.
Fig. 2.9    Predicted disability insurance enrollment if health status were identical
Note: Based on linear regression speciﬁ  cation in table 2.3.Work Disability    5 3
The picture changes only slightly from the last one. Hence, counterfactu-
ally assigning the same age, gender, and health distributions to all countries 
does not make the striking variation in the uptake of disability insurance 
across the thirteen countries go away. The large enrollment rates in Sweden, 
Denmark, and the Netherlands, especially, must have diﬀerent reasons than 
an older population or a worse health status in these countries.
2.5    The  Eﬀects of Disability Insurance
By exclusion of the ﬁ  rst two of the three popular explanations—demo-
graphic and health-  related diﬀerences—the third popular explanation 
remains; namely, institutional diﬀerences, speciﬁ  cally enrollment and eligi-
bility rules that make disability insurance beneﬁ  ts easier to receive and more 
generous in some countries than in others. Such rules may create incentive 
eﬀects similar to those exerted by old-  age pensions, which often provide a 
ﬁ  nancial incentive to retire early. In many countries, health requirements 
for disability insurance eligibility are weak. Under such circumstances, dis-
ability insurance may work as a labor market exit route to early retirement 
(Börsch-  Supan 2001). Many countries have established very lenient work 
disability eligibility rules under the conditions of high unemployment.
Alternatively, the large unexplained variation may include factors not 
measured by the three sets of variables corresponding to the three main 
causal attributions: demographics, health, and institutions. Ideally, we 
would model the entire complex set of eligibility and beneﬁ  t rules in each 
country as they apply to each individual in the sample, as the exercises in the 
Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004, 2005) volumes did. This is a massive project 
Fig. 2.10    Predicted disability insurance enrollment if age, gender, and health   status 
were identical in all countries
Note: Based on linear regression speciﬁ  cation in table 2.3.54    Axel  Börsch-Supan
only possible in a large team such as the team assembled by Gruber and 
Wise. Instead, we employ the institutional indicators provided by OECD 
(2003) that already entered the regression in table 2.4, and run a third coun-
terfactual simulation that makes these indicators identical for all individuals 
in our cross-  national sample. We then predict the take up outcomes in the 
same sprit as we did in ﬁ  gures 2.8 through 2.10.
The results are striking (see ﬁ  gure 2.11). The counterfactual simulation 
holding eligibility and beneﬁ  t generosity indicators constant produces much 
more similar disability uptake rates than holding demographics and health 
constant. The only outlier is Switzerland, where uptake rates would be 
extremely low under average generosity.
A simple back-  of-  the-  envelope regression conﬁ  rms the aforementioned 
results. Regressing the aggregate enrollment rates in the small sample of 
thirteen countries on ﬁ  ve of the previous indicator variables (coverage, 
minimum disability level required, beneﬁ  t generosity, medical assessment, 
vocational assessment) yields an R2 of 89 percent (adjusted 78 percent) and 
highly signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients. Hence, more than three- quarters of the cross-
  national variation in enrollment rates can be explained by the institutional 
factors embedded in the ﬁ  ve OECD indicators.
2.6    Summary  and  Conclusions
The variation in disability insurance take up rates across European coun-
tries is striking. It reaches from some 15 percent of individuals between 
ﬁ  fty-   and sixty-  ﬁ  ve-  years-  old in Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands to 
less than 3 percent in Austria and Greece.
In order to ﬁ  nd out which popular explanation is most convincing, we 
Fig. 2.11    Predicted disability insurance enrollment if eligibility and beneﬁ  t rules 
were equally generous in all countries
Note: Based on linear regression speciﬁ  cation in table 2.3.Work Disability    5 5
counterfactually equalize each potential cause among the thirteen countries 
in our joint SHARE-  ELSA-  HRS data set and then see whether disability 
insurance enrollments are also equal. Figure 2.12 summarizes the sequence 
of our results in a single chart.
Correcting for diﬀerences in the age, gender, and health distribution across 
countries does not explain this striking variation. The large enrollment rates 
in Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, especially, have diﬀerent reasons 
than an older population or a worse health status than in the other European 
countries.
Institutional factors—some of them creating strong incentives to enroll in 
disability insurance as an early retirement device—are a more likely explana-
tion. The counterfactual simulation holding eligibility and beneﬁ  t generos-
ity rules approximately constant (the leftmost bars in ﬁ  gure 2.12) produces 
much more similar disability uptake rates than holding demographics and 
health constant.
The most inﬂ  uential institutional variable in our regressions is the mini-
mum level of disability to obtain full beneﬁ  ts. This variable alone explains 
more than 60 percent of the cross- national variation. It seems to be the most 
powerful policy variable when countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and Sweden want to bring their disability insurance enrollment rates closer 
to the average European and U.S. level.
Fig. 2.12    Baseline enrollment rates and counterfactual simulations
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Comment  Robert J. Willis
The tension between a political desire to maintain welfare state beneﬁ  ts 
and the fact of rapid population aging generates many of the key problems 
facing European policymakers. Not only does population aging directly 
increase the costs of pension, health, and disability programs that beneﬁ  t the 
elderly, but economic theory and analysis has shown that these costs may be 
exacerbated by unintended incentive eﬀects. This point was made dramati-
cally in the cross-  national project of Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004, 2005) 
which showed powerful eﬀects of pension and disability plans on retirement 
behavior. Their initial analysis, based on country-  level administrative and 
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